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A need for a nAFTA PLuS
1. inTroDucTion
The completion of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
negotiations more than a decade ago was 
an historic event. It represented the first 
reciprocal free trade treaty among two 
industrialized countries and a develop-
ing one that was based on principles of 
equality and full reciprocity, in spite of 
vast asymmetries (the size of the Mexi-
can economy is just 5% of the United 
States). NAFTA created the second largest 
free trade area in the world, with almost 
400 million people and a third of world 
GDP (around US$8 trillion) and was 
negotiated as a way to encourage foreign 
investment in the member countries, 
especially direct investment (in plant and 
equipment) and to further the integration 
of the three North American countries 
through changes in institutions to facili-
tate cooperation  and  to expedite dispute 
resolution.  The NAFTA also included 
supplemental cooperation agreements to 
enhance and encourage protection of the 
environment and to improve and enforce 
labor standards in the region  
As a free trade area, the NAFTA 
project  was  essentially complete by the 
beginning of 2005.  Virtually all tariffs 
and quotas -- outside of agriculture – have 
been  eliminated.  Investment restrictions 
have been liberalized in Canada and 
Mexico.  Only the core of the Mexican 
energy sector remains off-limits to foreign 
investors.  The current crop of major trade 
disputes should be resolved in the next 
few years – softwood lumber (pitting the 
United States against Canada), trucking 
(pitting the United States against Mexico) 
and sugar and High Fructuose Corn Sirup 
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(pitting Mexico against the United States 
and vice versa, respectively).  
NAFTA,  without a doubt,  has been 
a commercial and investment success 
but that does not  mean that everyone in 
North America has prospered.   Mexicans, 
in particular, were devastated by the peso 
crisis of 1994/95, and many Mexicans 
have seen no increase in their real wages 
in over a decade.  To make matter worse, 
political elites in Mexico have been un-
able to agree on  important  reforms that 
are desperately needed in order  to ad-
dress structural problems of the Mexican 
economy.  Canadians have on average 
done much better, but Canadian prosper-
ity in the 1990s lagged by comparison 
with the “new economy” boom that swept 
the United States in the 1990`s, although 
this situation  has changed with the burst 
of the dot.com bubble and especially 
after September 11, 2001 and the Irak 
war. Trade  agreements, however, cannot 
be held responsible for all manner of fi-
nancial and structural shortcomings that 
slow down (or even reverse) economic 
progress.  Within a narrow commercial 
sphere, NAFTA has succeeded beyond the 
expectations of its advocates.  
On the other hand, the attacks of Sep-
tember 11 added a new dimension to the 
NAFTA project.  If economic borders had 
largely been dismantled under the banner 
of free trade, security borders suddenly be-
came more sensitive after September 11th. 
NAFTA countries as a result have  negoti-
ated new agreements on “smart borders” 
whose aim is to secure the borders while 
keeping them open to legitimate com-
merce  and the Security and Prosperity 
Partnership of North America  (SPPNA) to 
address a further set of policies that stand 
in the way of more beneficial trade and in-
vestment flows,  like cumbersome rules of 
origin, complex antidumping procedures, 
burdensome regulatory requirements, and 
other restrictive measures.   In this paper, 
however, I will suggest additional dimen-
sions which will have to be addressed 
to satisfy the twin goals of furthering 
economic integration while securing the 
North American borders.
In the second section of this paper: 
NAFTA:  Commercial and Investment  Suc-
cess, I recap the story of NAFTA’s success 
and review the  achievements Mexico has 
made, as a NAFTA member, in its origi-
nal goal of economic integration. In the 
second section, Commercial Success did 
not Benefit Everyone, however, I highlight 
the limitations of NAFTA for the purpose 
of achieving prosperity in Mexico. In 
this section, I discuss how -despite the 
significant contributions of NAFTA to 
the financial recovery of Mexico and for 
the achievement of economic stability 
and growth, it has not been enough and 
could not be enough . While trade policy 
can be a powerful instrument to promote 
development, it cannot be the only one, 
nor can it be a substitute for complemen-
tary domestic policies to address structural 
problems.  The final section, suggests ways 
to further economic and security integra-
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tion in North America,  that is,  to add a 
plus to NAFTA.
2. nAFTA: commerciAL 
AnD inVeSTmenT SucceSS
 
The central purpose of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
was to liberalize trade and investment be-
tween the three North American partners. 
(Mayer, 1998; Weintraub, 1997). As I will 
demonstrate in this section, this main goal 
of NAFTA has been achieved surpassing 
the  predictions of major studies that were 
undertaken before the negotiations were 
completed.  
Trade within nAFTA
Since NAFTA went into effect, trade 
flows between the partners have expe-
rienced substantial growth.1  Between 
1993 and 2004, Total trade among the 
NAFTA partners, increased at an average 
annual growth rate of 6,4% from $289 
billion to $698 billion. (throughout the 
paper, all money figures are expressed in 
US dollars).
In the case of Mexico and the United 
States, two-way trade boomed at an aver-
age annual growth rate of 17 percent, 
tripling between 1993 and 2004, rising 
from $85 billion to $280 billion.  Two-
way trade grew from 34 percent of Mexi-
can GDP (measured at market exchange 
rates) to 63 percent.  Mexican products 
increased their share in the US import 
market from less than 7 percent in 1993 
to 16.6 percent in 2004. Mexican exports 
and imports increased 291 per cent and 
148 per cent, respectively with a balance 
favorable to Mexico since the implementa-
tion of NAFTA in 1994.
 Other factors, besides NAFTA, ex-
plain part of this bilateral trade growth 
-- notably the strong U.S. economy in the 
1990s,  unilateral and multilateral trade 
liberalization, and the Mexican devalua-
tion of the peso in 1994-1995.   (Krueger, 
1999 and Flores and de la Peña, 2005). 
Empirical studies, however, persuasively 
show that   NAFTA was responsible for the 
exceptionally rapid expansion of Mexico-
U.S trade.  In an early study,   Mexican 
economists Enrique Espinoza and Pedro 
Noyola (1997) demonstrated that the 
patterns of sector-by-sector trade growth 
could only be explained by the shape of 
NAFTA liberalization. More recent stud-
ies of NAFTA reach similar conclusions. 
Ben Goodrich (2002), for example, used 
panel techniques to assess the causal ef-
fect of NAFTA on North American trade. 
He reached the conclusion that, in all six 
directions, North American merchandise 
trade substantially increased, and often 
1 The figures are based in information retrieved from the website of the Mexican Secretary of the Economy, 
Statistics Canada and the U.S. Commerce Department.
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doubled compared to what trade would 
have been in the absence of NAFTA. 
Goodrich also showed that trade created 
by NAFTA far exceeds trade diverted.
An important implication of the 
dynamism of bilateral trade is that there 
has been a shift in the value added com-
position of Mexican trade.  In 1985, raw 
materials and mining products were 62.4 
percent of total exports, of which the 
most important was crude oil. Starting 
in 1986, this proportion starts decreas-
ing until finally in 1993 reached a level 
of 19.6 percent of which oil meant 14.2 
percent. At the same time, manufactur-
ing exports grew every year from 1986 
to 2004, growth which surpassed every 
year the growth of GNP of manufacturing 
domestic output all of which meant that 
manufacturing exports became the engine 
of growth of domestic output. The evolu-
tion of manufacturing exports also clearly 
have shown a trend towards the produc-
tion of more complex goods in terms 
of its process of design, production and 
commercialization. As two observers have 
remarked: Mexico has become a: “reliable 
exporter of sophisticated products, from 
auto brake systems to laptop computers . 
. . increasingly Mexican engineers are de-
signing products and testing them in mul-
timillion dollar research and development 
centers”. (Smith and Malkin 1998)   
Additionally, the impact of export 
activity on regional development has 
been particularly significant because it 
has become geographically dispersed. In 
the past, Mexico’s export operations were 
concentrated in major cities like Mexico 
City, Guadalajara and Monterrey, and the 
northern border area.  Today, almost all 
of the 31 Mexican states, including rural 
states like Aguascalientes, Campeche, 
Durango, and Yucatan participate in in-
ternational trade. 
At the level of local government 
participation, state authorities have be-
come aware of the potential benefits that 
exports can bring to their states and have 
acted to encourage exports and attract 
investment.  For example, the state of 
Guanajuato, a major producer of apparel 
and footware, has opened trade offices in 
cities like Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles 
and New York as well as in London and 
Tokyo. In 1995, Guanajuato had 362 
exporting firms. By the end of 1998, this 
number had reached 768.    More than 15 
Mexican states have representation trade 
offices abroad, mostly in the U.S. For 
example, the states of Campeche, Tabasco 
and Yucatan have each opened trade of-
fices in the state of Florida and Jalisco has 
established close trade links with the states 
of Idaho, Oregon and Washington.  Trade 
has opened to subnational authorities new 
opportunities for bringing more national 
and foreign resources into their specific 
regions and has become an instrument 
for the promotion of each state’s develop-
ment agenda.
Mexico-Canada trade has also in-
creased under NAFTA, despite the geo-
graphic distance and limited historic ties. 
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In 2004, 11 years after implementation of 
NAFTA, Canada-Mexico two-way trade 
reached $8 billion, up from $4 billion 
in 1993. Canada has become Mexico’s 
fifth trading partner and the second most 
important market for its exports.   While 
bilateral trade numbers are small when 
compared to bilateral trade with the Unit-
ed States, the Canada-Mexico trade link 
has the potential for sharp expansion.
 
Foreign Direct investment
NAFTA is also an investment agree-
ment, aimed at facilitating both foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and portfolio 
investment.  In this area NAFTA has had 
also a very dramatic impact, especially in 
attracting  substantial amounts of FDI 
from NAFTA partners to Mexico, as 
compared  to previous periods.  FDI was 
an average of $4.6 bn per year during 
1989-94, almost trebled to $11.8 bn 
during 1996-2000,  reached a peak of 
$27.7 bn in 2001 and came down to an 
average of 14.6 bn in 2002-2004.  This 
growth in intra-regional FDI occurred in 
tandem with a tremendous expansion of 
intra-regional trade.  The obvious and 
well-known conclusion is that NAFTA 
accelerated the rationalization of North 
American production facilities,
The connection between trade liber-
alization and investment growth is illus-
trated by three sectors where commercial 
ties have been most extensive: the automo-
tive industry, textiles and clothing, and the 
electronics industry. In these three sec-
tors, deeper integration is clearly evident 
between the three economies.  Canadian, 
Mexican and US firms have relocated 
their production facilities and reposi-
tioned their supply patterns throughout 
the region, and they have used mergers 
and acquisitions across North America 
to strengthen their competitive stance. 
The reward has been higher productiv-
ity generally and a new role for Mexico 
Table 1. mexican Successful Sectors in nAFTA
Sectors
Electronic      
Products
Automotive products 
(Including Auto-parts)
Textile and clothing
Food, drinks and tobacco
Average Annual Growth 
of Mex. Exports 
19.0
14.8
19.1
16.7
% part. in 
U.S. imports   
1993-2003
10.1%-18.1%
7.1%-14.0%
4.4%-10.6%
4.3%-8.1%
New Jobs
110 000
200 000
260 000
100 000
Source: Secretaria de Economía del gobierno de México 
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particularly.  Within Mexico, NAFTA has 
encouraged more sophisticated automo-
tive, textile and clothing, and electronic 
products -- going beyond mere assembly -- 
with significant research and development 
work now conducted in Mexico.  These 
sectors have also been important genera-
tors of well paid jobs. Table 1 shows the 
high rate of increase in  Mexican exports 
in these sectors, their deep penetration 
of the US import market (which doubled 
in ten years) and the high proportion of 
jobs generated. 
 
3. commerciAL AnD 
inVeSTmenT SucceSS DiD 
noT beneFiT eVeryone
While NAFTA has been a commercial 
and investment success, it did not, and 
could not, bring universal prosperity to 
Mexico. Mexico experienced, in 1994-
1995, one of its worst economic crises 
since the great Depression. This crisis 
cannot be blamed on NAFTA, but rather 
on a combination of adverse political 
factors, unsound financial practices, and 
mismanaged monetary policy. (Naim and 
Edwards 1997). From the perspective of 
this paper, however,  the important obser-
vation is that recovery from the peso crash 
of 1994-95 was remarkably fast compared 
to recovery from the debt default and 
devaluation episode beginning in 1982. 
The difference can largely be attributed 
to the existence of NAFTA.
In 1982, Mexico’s immediate re-
sponse to the debt crisis was to drastically 
slash imports, building a protective for-
tress through stringent import quotas and 
prohibitive tariffs. Mexican imports fell by 
more than 50 percent, from $24 billion in 
1981 to only $9 billion in 1983.  It took 
Mexico seven years to get back to pre-crisis 
import levels.  After the 1994-1995 peso 
crisis, by contrast, Mexico’s membership 
in NAFTA did two things: it fostered a 
quick and ample financial rescue package, 
led by President Clinton; and it guaran-
teed continuity of Mexico’s trade policy, 
led by President Zedillo.  Mexico actually 
accelerated its liberalization program, and 
pre-crisis import levels were restored in 
around 18 months. (WTO, 1997)  
Another revealing indicator is in-
dustrial production. After the 1982 debt 
crisis, it took Mexico about 9 years to get 
back to its pre-crisis level of industrial 
output; in contrast, after the 1994-1995 
crash, it took Mexico less than two years to 
recover 1994 output levels (Heath, 1998). 
Mexican employment declined by more 
than 4 percent in 1995, but  between Au-
gust 1995 and August 2001, the Mexican 
economy generated 2 million new jobs. 
Around a million of these were related 
directly or indirectly to export activity. 
In 2001, the combination of  the 
US recession and a strong peso exchange 
rate led some multinational firms in 
manufacturing to close down operations 
for the first time in many years, blaming 
high labor costs. This trend continued in 
2002 and 2003 but stopped in 2004 and 
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the economy has begun recovering and 
generating  new jobs.  
In terms of wages, however,  while 
export growth has exerted a positive im-
pact,  the majority of Mexican workers 
have not seen an increase in real wages in 
over a decade.   Fortunately,  better times 
could be ahead on the Mexican wage 
front.  Employment as a percentage of the 
labor force rose from 84 percent in 1993 
to 95 percent in 2004.  Meanwhile, the 
percentage of the workforce engaged in 
agriculture dropped from 28 percent to 
17 percent (OECD 2001).  Tighter labor 
markets in urban areas could point to 
higher real wages in the next decade.  
To conclude the commercial story: 
NAFTA has boosted North American trade 
and investment to a remarkable extent. 
Trade liberalization played a major role in 
Mexico’s rapid recovery after the financial 
crisis of 1995. When the peso crashed, the 
Mexican economy went through a reces-
sion deeper than that caused by the 1982 
debt crisis.  However, in the aftermath 
of the 1995 financial collapse, recovery 
was far more rapid than expected.  Trade 
was central to this performance.  Given 
the collapse of the domestic market, the 
external market became the main engine 
for economic dynamism.   GDP contracted 
6.2 percent in 1995, however, if exports 
had remained stagnant, the free fall of 
the economy could have reached a –11 
percent  according to the Mexican Central 
Bank.  Between 1994 and 1995, exports 
grew by 30 percent, most going to the 
U.S. and allowed Mexico to get back on 
track to recovery.
Export activity currently accounts for 
half of Mexico’s GDP growth and almost 
one third of its overall GDP.  In 2004, 
Mexico’s GDP surpassed US$675 billion 
while Mexico’s total exports reached 
US$160 billion.  Mexico has become the 
eighth largest trading nation in the world 
and the first in Latin America.   The bulk 
of these exports are manufactured prod-
ucts, which represent more than 85% of 
Mexico’s total exports.
Yet,  Mexico  faced economic difficul-
ties in the 1990s and is experiencing  slow 
growth at the present time as a result of the 
US recession of 2000-2002 and especially 
for lack of  significant structural reforms 
for which consensus has not been forth-
coming among major political parties.
A nAFTA Plus
Mexico faces important challenges 
that must be addressed in the near future 
and for that purpose  it requires to recover 
sustained and robust economic growth. 
Mexico must grow at a level of 6 to 7 
percent in order to prevent further un-
employment.  This rapid growth will have 
to be financed by increased exports and 
a higher rate of domestic savings. Given 
the role that North American markets,  in 
particular the U.S.,  play for the Mexican 
economy and especially Mexican industry 
,  Mexican exports  will have to  maintain, 
increase  and solidify their   presence in 
D o S S i e r  o A S i S
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the Canadian and U.S. markets. 
 Clearly, this goal represents a sig-
nificant challenge especially now that 
Mexican exports are being displaced 
from important sectors of the US and 
Canadian market by more competitive 
Chinese products and more importantly 
now that assured access to the  U.S. market 
is not certain given the security concerns 
that became prevalent  in the U.S. by the 
events  of  September 11th, 2001. In ef-
fect,  the attacks of September 11  added 
a new dimension to the NAFTA project. 
If economic borders had largely been dis-
mantled under the banner of free trade, 
security borders suddenly became more 
sensitive. On September 11th, the U.S. 
adopted a series of measures at its borders 
north and south like the adoption of a 
high level alert of sustained and intense 
inspection which provoked a disruption 
of commercial traffic lasting for several 
weeks with a concomitant crisis for just-
in-time manufacturers, particularly auto 
companies, and a plunging of cross-border 
retail shopping and tourism.  This level 
of alert was reintroduced just before the 
U.S. started the invasion of Irak provok-
ing a similar disruption of cross border 
trade flows.  
In order to prevent future disruption 
of cross-border trade the three countries 
have negotiated new agreements on 
“smart borders” which aim: to secure the 
infrastructure and the flow of people and 
goods at the North American borders. 
(U.S. Department of  State.  “Smart 
Border…(2002) More recently, the three 
countries negotiated an agreement  called 
the Prosperity Partnership of North 
America  (SPPNA) aimed at getting rid of 
a  set of policies and measures  that stand 
in the way of more beneficial trade and 
investment flows like cumbersome rules of 
origin, complex antidumping procedures, 
burdensome regulatory requirements, and 
other restrictive measures.
All of these are sensible beginning 
measures to secure an open border for le-
gitimate goods and services and to further 
the facilitation of trade.  However, in my 
opinion, in order for the three countries 
to really achieve the deepening of  North 
American integration,  and prevent a worst 
case scenario in the security front  they 
will have to adopt an ambitious  project 
which could be called NAFTA Plus  to 
address not only border and supply line 
inspections  and trade facilitation but also 
further  and more ambitious cooperative 
polices in border management and three 
other fronts, namely,  in the elimination 
of external trade barrier and in the areas 
of  defense and in migration.2
2 Under a worse case scenario like an attack by a trained terrorist armed with biological or nuclear weapons, 
slipping into the United States from Tijuana or Vancouver, or grain contaminated with natural or man-
made biohazards was shipped from the United States to Canada or Mexico new security barriers could 
prove every bit as daunting to trade and investment flows as the tariffs and quotas that were negotiated 
away under NAFTA.
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In here, I will offer some ideas of 
what kind of  new policies would be need-
ed in the areas of border management and 
external trade barriers to achieve deeper 
integration in North America.   
border management
The whole point of NAFTA is to 
eliminate economic barriers – tariffs and 
quotas – at the two borders.  Apart from 
agricultural trade between Canada and 
its partners, and a handful of sensitive 
products in U.S.-Mexico trade, economic 
barriers have largely disappeared.  Until 
September 11th  the purpose of border 
inspections was to ferret out contraband 
(especially drugs), and provide security 
against dangerous merchandise. The at-
tacks of September 11th have added a 
new concern, namely, what we can call 
a worst case scenario,  like an attack by a 
trained terrorist armed with biological or 
nuclear weapons, slipping into the United 
States from Tijuana or Vancouver, or grain 
contaminated with natural or man-made 
biohazards  shipped from the United 
States to Canada or Mexico. 
We have mentioned that in order to 
prevent this scenario the three countries 
have negotiated the “smart border accords” 
and these have made some progress to 
date. For instance,  they have created the 
FAST Programs to permit the rapid and 
secure passage of legitimate commerce 
through the North American Borders. 
However, so far only a minimum pro-
portion of North American firms have 
registered into this program. 
In our opinion, however, is that in 
order to prevent a worst case scenario and 
really improve border management is    to 
move security inspections back from the 
border, to the plants where shipments 
originate, and to ensure continuous sur-
veillance from origination to destination. 
NAFTA partners have already taken the 
first step in addressing agricultural sani-
tary standards – relocating inspection and 
certification activity away from the border 
to farms and plants where agricultural 
produce is grown or processed.  U.S. meat 
inspectors routinely visit Canadian pack-
ing plants; U.S. agricultural inspectors are 
posted at Mexican avocado orchards.  The 
payoff is a faster trip across the border 
– plus better compliance with standards. 
After all, it’s harder to inspect a packed 
and refrigerated container truck than an 
open field or processing plant.   
What has already been accomplished 
in agriculture, should be implemented   in 
3 Under a worse case scenario like an attack by a trained terrorist armed with biological or nuclear weapons, 
slipping into the United States from Tijuana or Vancouver, or grain contaminated with natural or man-
made biohazards was shipped from the United States to Canada or Mexico new security barriers could 
prove every bit as daunting to trade and investment flows as the tariffs and quotas that were negotiated 
away under NAFTA.
D o S S i e r  o A S i S
422 
other segments of merchandise trade. This 
will require a host of low-tech and high-
tech innovations: audited security built 
into production lines, akin to ISO 9000; 
sealed and tamper-proof containers; con-
tinuous tracking of containers (using GPS) 
from origin to border to destination.3
The United States and Canada have 
made a start with a pilot program to in-
spect, at the Canadian port of entry, ship-
ping containers destined for the United 
States that arrive from Europe at Halifax 
and from Asia at Vancouver.  This is only 
a start, since the pilot program does not 
address the far larger volume of traffic 
originating in U.S., Canadian, or Mexi-
can plants.   Yet the technology exists for 
inspection and surveillance from point of 
origin to point of destination.  While it 
may be costly to implement, especially for 
small firms, the bigger obstacle is gaining 
political assent, from each North Ameri-
can partner, for intrusive practices that 
entail the presence of foreign customs of-
ficials.   Until that assent is forthcoming, 
and new systems are put in place, NAFTA’s 
future will be clouded by periodic episodes 
of border strangulation, as happened after 
September 11.
external Trade barriers
In the area of external trade barri-
ers, normally when conversation turns to 
deeper economic integration – going be-
yond a free trade area – the approach that 
springs to mind is a customs union with 
a common external tariff (CET).  That 
approach was pioneered by the Treaty of 
Rome (1957) for the European Economic 
Community, and copied for numerous 
economic unions since then.  While a 
CET has many attractions and despite 
the fact that there has been increased talk 
of transforming NAFTA into a Customs 
Union, in my opinion,  there is not at the 
present time a situation where the three 
countries could agree on a formula for 
choosing tariff rates for a CET. Equally 
difficult would be the problem of coordi-
nating NAFTA tariff offers in the context 
of WTO, FTAA, or bilateral trade nego-
tiations.  None of the NAFTA members 
would want to concede its own freedom 
of maneuver to the prior approval of its 
partners.  Even less acceptable would be 
delegation of negotiating authority to a 
supranational body, modeled after DG-1 
in the European Commission. 
It should be possible, nonetheless, to 
achieve many of the practical benefits of a 
common external tariff.  The NAFTA part-
ners could set a long-term goal of reducing 
their respective MFN tariffs to the lowest 
MFN level applied by Mexico, Canada 
or the United States, while each NAFTA 
3 A more detailed discussion of how this can be accomplished is provided in Hufbauer, Gary and Gustavo 
Vega-Cánovas, (2003). 
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partner would retain complete freedom to 
negotiate its rates in the WTO, the FTAA 
and bilaterally.  Rules of origin would be 
waived for tariff-free trade within NAFTA, 
provided that the exporting country did 
not import a significant quantity of the 
affected inputs at tariff rates more than 
(say) one percentage point lower than 
the MFN rates applied by the importing 
country.  The waiver procedure could 
be invoked on an annual basis by each 
importing firm. 
As a package, these reforms would 
not add up to a customs union. There 
would be no attempt to harmonize quo-
tas.  Individual NAFTA partners could still 
invoke antidumping and countervailing 
duties.  External MFN tariff schedules 
would converge only gradually.  Rules 
of origin would linger for many years. 
Nevertheless, from the vantage point of 
firms investing and trading within North 
America, these changes would go far to-
wards eradicating the residual commercial 
borders that still separate Canada, the 
United States and Mexico.4
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